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As citizens of the 'new' South Africa, we cannot afford to invest
in placebo cures to the past. We need to explore our consciences
and our complicity with recent history, deconstructing the
legacies of apartheid. This cannot only happen 'officially' as
it is currently through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
it is an invested process which involves the individual and needs
to be enacted on many levels as part of the process of
establishing a way forward and recognising that the future is
complex, en-grained and marked with the traces of the past, the
resonance of process.
- Artists' Statement, Fernando Alvim, Carlos Garaicoa, Gavin
Younge, Memorias Intimas Marcus
Artistic and cultural concerns in many ways engage with, yet are
distinct from the legal-political questions that will arise.
Betrayal, sadism, mourning, loss, confession, memory, reparation,
longing, these are the persistent themes of the arts. The
Commission will be examining the legal and political implications
of these same themes. Through the arts we can explore who we are,
and why we do what we do to one another. (Fault Lines exhibition
press release)
The above statements suggest that the TRC and art-making in
response to the TRC are somehow distinct, yet interdependent
processes. These were statements made to reflect the motivations
behind two particular art exhibitions created in response to the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Fault Lines, a series
of cultural responses to the Truth Commission explored a range of
themes including truth, memory, history, culpability, and
narrative. Memorias Intimas Marcus addressed itself to a story
not told in the TRC, that of the Angolan war experience. These
exhibitions were only two of several such works. In addition,
plays such as Wo. 4, Ubu and the Truth Commission, and A Story I
am About to Tell and visual art exhibits such as Judith Mason's
Requiem, Sue Williamson's Truth Games and Kim Berman's upcoming
Landscapes of the Truth Commission, all attempt to process and
project the personal accounts of suffering heard at the Truth
Commission outside of the Truth Commission venues and media
reportage.
To say that the TRC and art about the TRC are
interdependent, as in the quotations above, suggests more than a
one-way relationship whereby the TRC provides the content of the
art, but rather that the processes of truth-telling and its
aesthetic realization through artistic practice are both
necessary to carry out the promises of the TRC's nation-building
agenda. In the opinion of these artists, then, art such as
Memorias Intimas Marcus and the works exhibited at Fault Lines
are not mere representations of the TRC or its subject matter,
but instead are performative in the sense that they constitute an
action that brings about an effect. Many of these works actively
explore emotional and psychological responses to the deeds of the
past with the intended effect of causing the viewer to undergo
the same exploration (see White 1987:39).
By performing these explorations, art takes up a particular
tension within the TRC, that of collectivizing individual
memories. The TRC has sanctified these memories as public
knowledge and some of the artists, such as the Judith Mason's
and Nan Hamilton's work, have "repersonalized" them. As the
artists' statements above suggest, repersonalization is a
necessary step in the process of the societal transformation
towards a human rights culture which the TRC aims to achieve.
The difficulty arises while trying to assess what happens
to truth in this process. Beyond even the TRC, institutions such
ds schools and museums have concerned themselves with reclaiming
the truth of history. Truth claims the highest value, but facts
themselves do not carry the full weight of truth. How is one
history book to be valued over another? This is why the public
spectacle of the TRC ingrained in people's memories is so
important. Those who did not themselves suffer gross human
rights violation do not have recourse to these events through
their own memory. Their memory only leads them as far as the
spectacle of narration at the TRC. Survivors may remember the
events, but the broader public remembers the faces and voices of
these survivors of brutal violence as they told their stories
before the nation and the world. Whatever truth may be claimed
lies as much in the fact that these stories were told than in
what they told.
What happens to this truth when artists repersonalize TRC
stories, stories that they have not lived themselves? The
earliest artistic works on the subject of the Truth Commission
were the theatre pieces Ubu and the Truth Conunission and A Story
I am About to Tell. In each of these works a sharp distinction
was drawn between "truth" and "theatre". In Ubu puppets
delivered TRC testimony as direct proxies. They were not people
so they could not "repersonalize" the story. The creators of Ubu
were well aware that using puppets saved the audience from having
to believe an actor was telling a true story about herself. It.
was clear that the words did not belong to the puppet.
By contrast, A Story I am About to Tell used three actual
witnesses from the Truth Commission retelling their own stories
on stage. But both Ubu and Story can be felt to have the same
aim: they did not want to compromise the truth of the stories
they were re-presenting in the context of the otherwise fictional
space known as theatre. In addition to their hesitations in
using actors to deliver testimony, the playwrights were also
careful to script the testimony scenes as separate from, rather
than part of, the plot. Scenes of testimony interrupt and
suspend the stage action, and the audience recognizes the stage
configuration as that belonging to the Truth Commission. The
"theatre" resumes once the testimony is finished. Hayden White
maintains that a narrative is taken to be true the more closely
it resembles the events it is narrating (1987: 27). Since the
events are only accessible through their narration, then
preserving the narration is an integral component to preserving
the truth. Both of these plays seem to express and uneasiness
about presenting narrated "truth" from the TRC in a theatrical
context. To allay this tension, both remained true to the
performance of telling the truth.
Other artistic works in response to the Truth Commission
depart from re-presenting the testimonial accounts literally but
nevertheless retain their presence in some form. In an exhibition
of Judith Mason's work, which is full of evocative images
inspired by two newsclippings penned by Antjie Krog, the two
newspaper clippings containing quotes from the testimony of
perpetrators during exhumations hang on the wall. The text of
the testimony is still present and makes itself felt as a
separate entity. Everywhere in the actual works on display,
however, hundreds of quotations from authors and politicians,
South African and international, any source but the TRC testimony
itself become sinews and filaments written out arduously by hand
on strips and sheets of plastic. And on the centerpiece, a gown
constructed of blue plastic bags of the kind "the woman who kept
silent" as Mason calls her, Mason pens a tribute in her own
words. This series actually expresses both a personal process of
coming to terms and of paying homage.
Sue Williamson's exhibition Truth Games retains grossly
fragmented and dissected text from the TRC hearings arranged on
sliding panels with photographic images that viewers can
manipulate themselves as a demonstration of the multiple version
of truth being produced at the TRC and the people's lives and
deaths caught in between.
Sue Williamson's exhibition Truth Games and Nan Hamilton's
site-specific theatre work, Wo. 4 begin to blur these lines
between using testimony as a means of retaining truth value and
repersonalizing truth. Both incorporate literal excerpts of TRC
testimony but add the artist's or the audience's agency to the
production of truth. In Sue Williamson's work the audience could
manipulate multiple versions of truth. In the "Domestic Court"
scene of Hamilton's No. 4, testimony from the TRC was transcribed
and then workshopped with the actress to generate associations
from her own personal history to construct her re-performance of
this testimony. For the different reasons I have named, these
pieces would qualify as what Andre Brink sees as necessary in
"post-apartheid narrative". Like Sue Williamson, Brink sees the
need to acknowledge multiple versions of truth. For Brink
multiple truths stem from the unreliability of memory.
Williamson's work goes further in demonstrating the active role
of the viewer/receiver in the creation of truth. Brink
emphasizes that "if stories offer several versions of history,
that is, of 'given' events (even though, of course, ultimate
nothing is ever 'given'), the imperative of choice is even more
urgent, and certainly more richly textured and more rewarding"
(1998: 41). Brink is careful to say that choice is so important
not because historical events may never have happened, but after
Derrida and Hayden White, that they cannot escape their condition
of narrativity.
Brink cannot quite bring together his two statements about
the importance of choice and the existence of historical facts,
however. They seem almost to contradict one another. This is
because Brink sees the TRC as an essentially fact-finding
enterprise as opposed to fiction, which is an enterprise of the
imagination (1998: 30). However, as I have emphasized earlier,
in speaking about artistic works constituting a re-performance of
the TRC, the facts cannot be divorced from the performance of
public testimony.
Performing the past/ telling the truth
The TRC, as a national ritual, has profiled itself as a
performance model for narrating the past. In Argentina, the Truth
Commission took place behind closed doors. It is not surprising,
then, that post-dictatorship "theatre of conscience" (Maree 1998:
24) in Argentina does not include performances of testimony, but
instead still re-performs acts of violence in order to highlight
past injustices to help build a new future through the spectacle
of re-enactment. In South Africa, by contrast, the TRC has
inserted itself into the chain of performances about the past.
Just before the TRC had pervaded the consciousness of South
African citizens, there had been theatre works such as Andre
Brink's Die Jogger, The Biko Project and Maria-Maria which told
stories or detention and torture through re-ennactment (Maree
1998: 27). During and post-TRC, people feel in a different
place, they are consciously looking back from the present rather
than revisiting the past. They are narrating memory or reacting
emotionally to the narrated memories of others.
The TRC performance model prescribes that people tell
stories from their own experience. Using Richard Schechner's
notion of performance as restored behaviour, the artistic works I
am discussing may be seen as the restored behaviour of telling
traumatic stories which takes place at the TRC. In Schechner's
rubric however, much as we have discussed in terms of Brink,
White and Derrida, the TRC itself is also a performance.
The TRC exhibits the restoration of several behaviors: that
of storytelling, testimony, the courtroom, the church, and --in
its subject matter -- of some of the violent acts committed under
apartheid, here restored in narrated form. What the TRC is
restoring is not facts, but previous performances with the
effects that they produce. For example, the TRC helps to produce
the atmosphere of forgiveness by often invoking religious
symbolism, singing hymns and by soliciting confession.
Superimposed upon this, however, is the semblance of a legal
hearing designed to bring about an amnesty judgement based on
loosely legislated concepts such as political motivation and full
disclosure but which are difficult to determine on a purely
objective basis. Restoring the behavior of storytelling or oral
history intends educational purposes. And in her recent book,
Excitable Speech, Judith Butler argues that speech carries
action, not just meaning and that speech describing or
threatening violent acts on some level actually performs those
acts. (I have discussed this in detail in another paper and so
will not do so here [Marlin-Curiel unpub 1999)). All of these
performances are distilled into the Truth Commission. Using a
performance model instead of a semiotic model focuses our
attention on actions and their outcomes rather than on their
signs and their referents.
A performance model also results in the by now infamous
search for origins or the elusive "true event". Performance
theorists such as Schechner and Butler have emphasized that
performance is always a repetition of another performance. They
further claim, however, that each repetition produces a
difference, that a behavior can never be behaved exactly the same
way twice (add refs). This is on the one hand presented as an
unavoidable condition. On the other, the possibility of shifting
meanings by purposely presenting events in a different form is
the very potential that performers exploit to support their
intentions. In a performance both intended and unintended
meanings are produced. The point is that performance is always
motivated by the intention to produce certain effects.
Performances, which are repetitions of previous performances
carry with them the intentions and effects of those performances
and it depends on conditions and contingencies under which an act
j.s performed that determines whether any of those intentions and
effects manifest.
Testimony is such a performance where the intention to tell
the truth and the effect that its truth be accepted is all-
important. As I hope I have made clear by the previous
discussion of the TRC as a performance model that the artistic
works discussed in this paper are not about representing
historical events but testifying to them. The TRC as a public
performance has inserted itself in the chain of performing the
past. Testimony is a performance that carries the intention of
truth telling and with the effect that the testimony is accepted
as truth. This is very different from focusing on the foreclosed
inability for the words spoken to achieve a direct representation
of the true event. Because of the association of these works of
art with the TRC and their reference to incidents revealed
through the TRC, the viewer will expect that the art adhere to
truth by re-performing the action of testimony. The audience or
spectators will be evaluating the work of art for its truth-value
as much as for its imaginative worth. This is because testimony
is the type of performative speech act which depends upon the
acceptance of its meaning by the recipient.
J.L. Austin describes a performative speech act as one
which "does something" through its very utterance. There are
certain conditions that must be met, however. In many instances,
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certain thoughts and feelings must accompany the act or
reciprocal actions must be performed. A bet must be accepted,
for example. A gift must be received. If these conditions are
not met, the performative is "unhappy"; in other words, the
utterance fails to "perform" whatever function it was meant to
have. Testimony is such a speech act. According to Shoshana
Felman, testimony is a speech act, whose verbal utterance serves
as material evidence for truth (add ref). When testimony is used
as means of learning the truth, the truth must be accepted
usually by an institution such as the TRC, which acts on behalf
of the broader audience.
When faced with performative repetitions of the TRC in
artistic works, then, the truth that the audience seeks is a
recognition of one of the intended or unintended results of the
performance of testimony at the TRC. Like the TRC, art about the
TRC should in some way provoke a coming to terms with the events
of the past. It is therefore terribly important that that these
events be thought to have actually happened even if we can never
hope to know exactly what happened. Even if memory cannot be
relied upon as a source of fact, memory does at least serve as
evidence that something happened. As a means of completing,
supplementing or repeating the work of the TRC, art must engage
memory and testimony, which make up the core of the TRC. The goal
of art in response to the TRC, according to the quotations cited
at the top of this paper, is to provoke spectators to explore
their own emotions and consciences in relation to the past. A
work of art that already constitutes a performance of such a
personal process of testifying to one's own trauma is better
equipped to provoke a repetition of such a process.
Thus far I have argued that the TRC is a performance of
truth telling. Art about the TRC aims, as is evidenced by the
artist's statements, to supplement the TRC process. Its aims are
therefore performative rather than representational. As a re-
performance of the TRC's performance its primary identification
as such depends upon its engagement with the testimonial act.
Testimony is defined by narrating a true story from one's own
remembered experience. As an act of telling the truth, testimony
is accepted as true unless something carrying the same weight of
truth such as another testimony contradicts it. The reason
testimony is solicited is that the witness is thought to have
first-hand knowledge which is more difficult to contradict than a
list of facts from some other source either written or provided
by someone who has not sworn to tell the truth. When lawyers
listen to testimony, it is as vital to their proceedings that not
only the facts be verified but that the witness has first-hand
knowledge giving them the "authority or authenticity" to speak.
What remains to be discussed in this paper are the implications
of private memory becoming public and being retold through a
voice without the "authority" to speak. Secondly, in light of
this, we need to ask whether there is still a line to be drawn
between truth and fiction, between art and reality.
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Narrative process and the aesthetics of metaphor
Except in the case of A Story I am About to Tell, the fact
that the artists have not themselves suffered gross human rights
violations in some cases has caused tremendous outcry. At
Memorias Intimas Marcus, Cape artist Tyrone Appollis directly
challenged the artists to the point of violence. The issue of
black representation by white artists has been raised in
connection with theatre makers such as Brett Bailey and Robyn
Orlin who have been accused of appropriating black imagery and
myth for their iconographic spiritual capital (see Mail and
Guardian date??). This is the same debate raised in connection
with art based on traumatic experience. Does the non-trauma
survivor or non-black portrayer of traumatic or black images
(without making a direct equivalency) have the ability, or more
importantly the authority, to create these images? Does their
art have any testimonial or truth-value? Truth is not generally
thought of as a primary criterion for assessing a work of art.
Could it be that truth, as tied to memory, becomes a requirement
in assessing works of art dealing with subjects of painful
history? How can collective memory retain the truth of personal
memory?
Art inspired by TRC testimony generates that same kind of
sensitivities as art on the Holocaust. Adorno's injunction that
no poetry be written after the Holocaust (add ref) hangs in the
air with a silent weight around discussions of the Holocaust and
representation. Many scholars have pronounced the Holocaust as
unspeakable and unrepresentable. When they say this they mean
that the Holocaust is even less accessible through aesthetic
means than it is in fact. Thus the recent criticisms of Roberto
Begnini's Life is Beautiful as being too much a fiction with no
basis in fact. Paul Lanzmann's approach in his, Shoah, was to
gather Holocaust survivors and filmed interviews with them. There
are hardly any images other than the witnesses, and no narrative,
just testimony. Lanzmann's opinion of Spielberg's Schindler's
List is that it transgresses the ethics of unrepresentability.
"Fiction," he says, "is a transgression" (Kearney 1999: 28).
Of course, the TRC has well demonstrated that the horrors of
apartheid are not unspeakable, but perhaps they are in
unspeakable in any other terms but testimonial ones. What does it
mean to treat atrocity by fictionalizing it through the addition
of the imagination, aestheticizing it though use of metaphor, or
narrativizing it by making comprehensible?
Some of these processes are already at work in the TRC.
Njabulo Ndebele has called the TRC an example of a people
reinventing themselves through narrative (1998: 27).
The narrative of apartheid, which can now be told,
has reached that part of the plot where vital
facts leading to the emergence of understanding
are in the process of being revealed...it is going
to be the search for meanings that may trigger off
more narratives. If and when that happens, the
imagination, having been rescued by time, will be
the chief beneficiary. The resulting narratives
have less and less to do with facts themselves and
with their recall than with the revelation of
meaning through the imaginative combination of
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those facts. At that point, facts will be the
building blocks of,metaphor (1998:27).
In other words, Ndebele seems to be saying that at the
moment of making meaning through narrative, the facts immediately
disappear into the receSses of metaphor.
This is evident in the way the TRC selects particular
testimonies, briefs witnesses and then poses a specific set of
questions so that it can construct certain narratives, certain
truths. For example, with the testimony of Ellen Kuzwayo, author
of Cdll Me Woman, the Commissioners posed a host of questions
about the role of community struggle in Soweto just before the
uprising in 1976. As an emblem of the struggle, Kuzwayo was
considered an authoritative source to speak on behalf of the
community. Belinda Bozzoli (1998) makes a similar point in
analyzing the hearings in Alexandra and how the testimonies were
shaped to reinforce the historical identity of the community.
Other testimonies were used to create images of mutilated bodies,
and others for the images of mothers and lost children.
The media has often remarked upon the TRCs theatrical
qualities. In talking to artists about why there is not more art
about the Truth Commission the frequent answer is that the Truth
Commission is already so dramatic, it defies further
dramatization. These expressions of the absolute extraordinary
echo Njabulo Ndebele's (1991) words about the "Rediscovery of the
Ordinary": the everyday lives of blacks under apartheid, just
like these stories of outrageous torture and killing, are already
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beyond what the imagination could dream up. This may be a reason
why testimony or autobiography is generally preferred as a mode
of expression for people who suffered either the absurdities of
everyday life, or gross human rights violations under apartheid.
But there are two points that need to be made here. One is
that even testimony, as narrative, includes an element of
aestheticization. For Bakthin, to hold a vision of a separation
between art and reality is already to have aestheticized reality
since it has become subject to perception (1990: 276). In the
terms in which I was discussing earlier being able to describe
reality, for example, in narrative form is already to have
perceived and shaped it. This is what Derrida and Adorno mean by
aestheticization and it is the sense in which I use it here
(Menke? :227) . According to Derrida and Adorno, the fact of this
aestheticization of reality subverts reality's capacity to be
understood non-aesthetically.
It is even possible to say that aestheticization of
experience already occurs at the level of the speaker in the
process of testifying to individual experience as a means of
speaking on behalf of others. Testimony is often offered as a
means of representing a collective voice against an oppressive
established system as in the Latin American model. At the TRC,
testimony is on the one hand an emphatic voice of the newly
legitimized individual citizen as much as it becomes a symbolic
collective representation of suffering.
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The aesthetic and non-aesthetic stances even emerge, as
Diana Taylor observes, in the testimonios of post-Dirty War
Argentina. Alicia Portnoy's testimonio to the torture she and
others suffered displays what Taylor calls doubling. Portnoy
refers to herself sometimes in the first person and sometimes in
the third person. The distancing that the third person or what
we might call an aesthetic stance is a means of survival. She
.situates herself outside her own experience (1997: 171). She is
first her own audience and must translate her experience to
herself through language. As Kali Tal notes, "Traumatic
experience catalyzes a transformation of meaning in the signs
individuals use to represent their experiences...as it is spoken by
survivors, the traumatic experience is reinscribed as metaphor
(1995: 16).
In the TRC another kind of doubling occurs in the body of
"the nation" undergoing this process. There is an inherent
split between victims and non-victims. There are those who are
outside the experience of gross human rights violations (although
implicated within it by their very position of being on the
outside). If both the TRC and art about the TRC are to fulfill
the injunction of testimony, it must intend to convey a story of
injustice and suffering to those who were directly or indirectly
responsible or to those in power to change the system. It is in
fact the people outside their experience, then, that are the
intended audience.
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If the spectator/listeners are outside the experience, then
it will require a metaphorical imagining on the part of the
audience in order to receive the material. Rather than a
process or recognition of self-revelation it will be one of
trying to imagine oneself as the other as either perpetrator or
victim in the story. According to Tal, if the listener has
suffered a similar experience, then the narration might trigger
visceral memories from their own experience (1996: 16). Tal is
speaking of literature by trauma survivors but the same could be
said of spoken testimony:
Survivors have the metaphorical tools to interpret
representations of trauma similar to their own. The
representations may trigger "flashbacks" in the
survivor-reader. However, the reexperience o£
trauma in the reader will always be derived from
the reader's own traumatic experience rather than
the survivor-author's (1996: 16).
As discussed earlier, the process of narration through testimony
already places the testimony on the level of metaphor and Tal
here points out that for survivor-readers (or listeners),
reception is also metaphorical. Thus from the vantage point of
the viewer, there should be little difference between the
testimony of a survivor of trauma and that of a non-survivor
since both must be understood on the level of metaphor.
Yet, on several occasions, discomfort has been expressed
over what seems to some as a denial of memory and truth. Nan
Hamilton's Wo. 4 and Judith Mason's Requiem received different
kinds of criticism from the Memorias Intimas Marcus exhibition
where the artists were being accused of representing something
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they did not know anything about. Judith Mason, whose
exhibition opened at a gallery in Wynberg outside of Cape Town,
received hate letters from some right wing Afrikaners who were
horrified that she was giving so much credibility and empathy to
the motives of Truth Commission which they deemed was nothing but
a witch hunt. Nan Hamilton, on the other hand, was criticized
for not telling the stories of people who had been held in the
Johannesburg Fort, where the piece was performed. In Judith
Mason's case, although she was English, it was as if her identity
as a white South African should have dictated her response. To
her critics, she was clearly speaking for the wrong side. They
could accept this kind of reverence perhaps coming from a black
but not. from a white. In Nan Hamilton's case, the Fort as a
place of history that had its own story to tell was being denied
its own authorship. Neither Judith Mason nor Nan Hamilton in
their critics eyes could be the authors of the stories they were
telling. The audience experienced a confusion over authorship
since the Fort competed too much with the non-Fort related
histories being told there. Judith Mason's sympathy for the
subjects of her art competed with the stories of those subjects
themselves and with her presumed identity as being one of the
"beneficiaries" of the system which caused their deaths. A
similar criticism has been made of Antjie Krog, where in her book
Country of My Skull, her own suffering and distress while
reporting on the victims hearings seemed to overshadow that of
the victims themselves (Braude? M&G 1998?).
I'J
Moral authority and the author
Where witnesses may have motivation to lie, as in the case
of the amnesty hearings, the authority to speak is unchallenged
by the audience. There would be no cause to question whether or
not a person has the authority to tell a lie since it holds the
lowest moral value. The truth, however, holds too much moral
capital to allow access to just anyone, especially when moral
capital has the chance of turning into real capital or when it is
being claimed by those who are perceived as less deserving of
moral highground.
What are we to understand, then, by the term collective
memory? Does it have truth-value? Is it truly communal
property? According to Foucault, an author is merely a means by
which a piece of writing or artwork can be ascribed value and
enter into circulation (1984:?). The same may be said of the
label of truth as we have seen it to be contingent upon the
possibility of assigning an author -- but an authentic author,
one who has experienced the non-aesthetic version of their
aesthetic object. Since the TRC "authorizes" the truth of the
testimonies, it potentially becomes the author in the sense that
it is "testimonies from the TRC" that are circulated and
exchanged.
The TRC may be accepted as an author as well as the
individual victims themselves, but what of the non-TRC witness,
the non-survivor of trauma? Is there a story -- is there a truth
2(1
to be told in nor. surviving trauma, or of surviving, as Dori
l..,,ub would say, t.he tuuma of listening (1992: 57-58)? Can this
type of testimony be accorded equal moral value to the survivor's
testimony?
As Hayden White notes, inherent in historical events is a
contest of memory, an inherent drama, a struggle for truth. As a
moral principle is so often the guidepost of any narration, the
narrator must be thought to hold moral authority (1987: 21). In
.'iuiith Africa where artists and citizens are dealing with the
enigma of reconciliation and restorative justice in place of
retributive justice, ethics and historical truth are vital to the
cause of transformation. The TRC seeks to write and then close
the book on the past. It creates a moral narrative of the
transition from an unjust to a just society, where the previously
silenced now speak. The protagonists of the TRCs moral
narrative are the survivors, the ones who speak the truth, the
possessors of memory. Perhaps at the end of the process the TRC
will succeed in creating moral equality for all, a blank slate.
At this stage, however, relinquishing of moral authority, and of
the truth of memory, to non-survivors, even artists, amounts to a
relinquishing of authorship. Without an author, the narrative
may not be written at all.
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